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Abstract 
The concept of intersectionality has been progressively incorporated into international anti-
discrimination law. This article considers the nature of this incorporation and the different 
understandings of the term and related concepts by United Nations treaty body committees. It 
discusses the importance of intersectionality within a substantive equality framework in 
challenging poverty that is often complex in nature. This is illustrated with examples from the 
field of social security in India, Australia and South Africa as they concern issues of race, 
gender, caste and class. The article suggests the need for a clear conception of 
intersectionality embedded within a substantive approach to equality and for greater 
uniformity of this equality framework across the human rights treaty system. 
Key words: international anti-discrimination law, substantive equality, intersectionality, 
social security 
Introduction 
The concept of intersectionality has been given express recognition in international law in 
recent years, although its roots go back some years earlier. Intersectionality has an important 
role in ensuring that the needs of the most disadvantaged groups are not overlooked in 
measures to address inequality. This article proposes a clearer integration of the concept of 
intersectionality within an understanding of substantive equality so as to challenge complex 
poverty that is enmeshed with inequality. This integrated equality framework requires 
consistent application across the United Nations (UN) human rights treaty system. 
International human rights law contains strong commitments to non-discrimination and 
equality. As is common in domestic discrimination law, international law refers to 
discrimination on the basis of certain identified grounds. Listed grounds, for example in Art 
2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
include ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status’. Entire treaties are dedicated to particular groups facing 
discrimination and disadvantage, including people defined in terms of their race, women, 
people with disabilities, children and migrants. The grounds of discrimination are historically 
contingent categories that are determined by law to represent the varieties of social stigma 





In interpreting the injunction against discrimination and the principle of equality, the treaty 
committees have developed, over some years, a body of commentary on the meaning of 
equality and non-discrimination and the way in which these concepts should be understood 
and operationalised by member states. One of the issues that such commentary attempts to 
address is what happens when discrimination arises in relation to two or more grounds. This 
question points to the complex nature of inequality that does not always lend itself to redress 
in terms of distinct legal categories. Thus, the same person might face discrimination related 
to their race, gender, nationality, class, religion and language. Included within some of the 
treaty committee responses to this question is the idea of intersectionality. The term, coined 
by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), was a response to the ‘single-axis framework’ of US anti-
discrimination law but was also part of a broader critique by black feminists of feminist and 
antiracist approaches. The idea of intersectionality is that different forms of discrimination 
arise at the intersection of traditional grounds of discrimination. Thus, black women may 
encounter different and distinct experiences of discrimination from those experienced by 
black men or white women and these may not be addressed by considering single forms of 
discrimination based on race or gender alone. This idea has proved highly influential in 
feminist legal theory, in feminist theory more broadly and in wider scholarship on identity. It 
has become an important addition to anti-discrimination law in some jurisdictions and, as 
noted, has found its way into international law. Its application has gone beyond race and 
gender to cover the intersection of a range of grounds or categories of discrimination.  
Intersectional discrimination should be distinguished from other situations where more than 
one ground of discrimination is present. Thus, a person may be discriminated against on the 
basis of a number of grounds rather than on the basis of a new form of discrimination that 
arises at the intersection of two grounds. This compounded or additive discrimination means 
that more than one type of discrimination is directed at a single person. For example, a club 
may prohibit admission by women, black people and Jews. A black Jewish woman would be 
discriminated against on the basis of three grounds and could assert her claim of 
discrimination on the basis of any or all of these. This is different from the situation where a 
single provision may discriminate against more than one group on the basis of different 
grounds (Albertyn and Goldblatt 2007, 52). For example, a law might prevent unmarried 
couples from accessing certain benefits that married couples are entitled to. This could 
discriminate against same-sex couples unable to marry (discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation) and couples married in terms of Muslim law whose marriages may not receive 
official recognition (discrimination on the basis of religion). Both of these should be 
distinguished from intersectional discrimination where, for example, able-bodied women or 
men with disabilities might not experience the particular forms of discrimination that women 
with disabilities face, such as forced sterilisation and heightened exposure to sexual abuse. 
Conaghan (2009) raises important critiques about the limits of intersectionality in producing 
theory that explains inequality and the broader relations that produce it. She argues that 
intersectionality is overly ‘bound up with notions of identity and identity formation’ that, 
while important, are insufficient in investigating structural economic and distributive causes 
of disadvantage and their relationship to issues of identity/recognition (2009, 29–30). Her 
conclusion is that ‘law’s equality-seeking strategies should flow directly from an analysis of 
the (inter)operation of inequality regimes, including but not restricted to the ordering effects 
of law itself’ (2009, 42). This challenging approach requires an awareness of the limits of 
intersectionality as a concept, but also points to the need to ensure that use of this concept is 
thoroughly integrated within a deep understanding of inequality and its multiple causes and a 




In taking on this challenge, this article argues that the concept of intersectionality should be 
embedded within a multidimensional understanding of substantive equality. Substantive 
equality is a concept developed in response to a formal notion of equality that requires 
everyone to be treated alike. This formal equality approach would limit affirmative measures 
aimed at overcoming the historic disadvantages of certain groups. It is likely to perpetuate 
disadvantage if it does nothing more than open up opportunities on an equal basis. For 
example, removing legal barriers to the employment of people with disabilities will not 
necessarily lead to their equal representation in the labour force. A substantive equality 
approach recognises that more active efforts are needed to address underlying, systemic 
inequalities if real change is to result. A multidimensional understanding of substantive 
equality requires status-related and distributive inequalities to be addressed alongside 
inequalities in participation, as well as measures to be taken to accommodate difference and 
transform institutions (Fredman 2011). This article suggests that a close connection between 
this understanding of equality and social and economic rights will assist in responding to 
complex poverty. Poverty, like inequality, is multidimensional. Complex poverty arises 
where a range of social, cultural and economic factors converge to deepen and entrench 
material disadvantage (Bradshaw 2007). For example, a child may be denied education 
because of her gender, leading to poor employment outcomes and consequent inability to 
obtain adequate food or healthcare. Another illustration of the complexity of poverty is where 
a girl’s inadequate nutrition (sometimes arising because sons are given preference where food 
is scarce) may lead to poor health that affects her ability to generate a sustainable livelihood. 
Disempowerment, discrimination and stigma are some of the factors that complicate, deepen 
and entrench poverty. 
The article begins by examining the way in which the concept of intersectionality has 
developed within international law. It shows that there is a growing acceptance of the need to 
examine inequality intersectionally, but that this is not always fully integrated into a 
substantive equality approach and is not articulated consistently across the UN human rights 
system. The article then looks at three examples in the field of social security and social 
protection to illustrate the need for a fuller intersectional equality framework within 
international law that can aid in addressing poverty in its complexity. The first example 
concerns India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act; the second 
example considers the policy of income management within Indigenous communities in 
Australia’s Northern Territory; and the third example discusses the extension of South 
Africa’s aged pension to a group of men previously excluded from this benefit. These 
examples illustrate the need to tease out the layers of discrimination that shape poverty and 
disadvantage and the importance of an effective equality framework to aid in this process. In 
the final section, the article discusses why a clearer reframing of intersectionality within 
international anti-discrimination law would be of benefit at the international and domestic 
level, the features of such a framework, and the need for a more consistent or unified 
articulation of intersectionality within substantive equality across the treaty system. 
Intersectionality in international law 
The close connection between poverty and inequality requires human rights responses that 
are able to engage with the complex forces that shape social and economic disadvantage. This 
section of the article surveys the development of the idea of intersectionality within 
international anti-discrimination law as one of the responses to this challenge. It finds that 
there is a growing understanding of this concept, but that this is not consistent across the 




International human rights law contains a range of references that challenge unitary notions 
of discrimination within single categories.
1
 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, refers in its preamble to 
issues of race and poverty affecting women. There are Articles on rural women (Art 14), 
nationality (Art 9), girls (Art 10) and marital status (Arts 16 and 1) that highlight the 
connections between arenas of discrimination. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), adopted in 1989, contains articles on children with disabilities (Art 23) and refugee 
children (Art 22). The newer Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
adopted in 2006, specifically mentions women with disabilities where it says: ‘States Parties 
recognize that women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple discrimination, and in 
this regard shall take measures to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by them of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Art 6(1)). 
Over the past 15 years, the treaty bodies responsible for the various human rights instruments 
have identified a range of terms to discuss discrimination implicating more than one ground. 




In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination produced General 
Recommendation No 25 on the gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination. The 
Committee made the following commitment: ‘Recognizing that some forms of racial 
discrimination have a unique and specific impact on women, the Committee will endeavour 
in its work to take into account gender factors or issues which may be interlinked with racial 
discrimination’ (para 3, emphasis added). It gave examples of ‘racial bias-motivated rape’, 
abuse of domestic workers and forced sterilisation of indigenous women (para 2). The 
Committee called for improved qualitative and quantitative reporting by states with 
disaggregated data on race and gender. While the word ‘interlinked’ was used, the examples 
illustrate an intersectional understanding of race and gender discrimination. 
Also in 2000, the Human Rights Committee, responsible for the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, in General Comment No 28 on Art 3 (the equality of rights 
between men and women) noted that: 
Discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on other grounds such as race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. States parties should address the ways in which any instances of discrimination on other grounds 
affect women in a particular way, and include information on the measures taken to counter these effects. 
[Paragraph 30, emphasis added.] 
The Committee also referred to the position of women in minority communities (para 32). 
Here, the word ‘intertwined’ was used in relation to discrimination of women on a range of 
grounds. The notion that certain women might experience discrimination in a ‘particular way’ 
seems to reflect an appreciation of intersectional discrimination. 
                                                          
1
 For earlier discussions of intersectionality in international law, see Crooms 1997; Green 2002; Makkonen 
2002; and Bond 2003. For a discussion of intersectionality in European Union law, see Bullock and Masselot 
2012. For a discussion of intersectionality and Australian anti-discrimination law, see Mansour 2012.  
2
 This involved a survey of human rights treaties and the General Comments and Recommendations of the 
relevant treaty bodies. It also considered treaty body reporting guidelines. It did not examine treaty body 
jurisprudence, Concluding Observations and Recommendations or the work of special mandates holders. A 




Thus far, references to intersectionality, albeit using different language, referred specifically 
to women. In 2009, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 
General Comment No 20 on non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (Art 
2, para 2, of the ICESCR) provided a more general consideration of the grounds of 
discrimination within a discussion of substantive equality. It stressed the need to ensure 
substantive and not just formal equality. In so doing, it provided some guidance on the 
determination of grounds of discrimination when it stated that:  
Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals which 
suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal treatment of individuals 
in similar situations. States parties must therefore immediately adopt the necessary measures to prevent, 
diminish and eliminate the conditions and attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de facto 
discrimination. For example, ensuring that all individuals have equal access to adequate housing, water 
and sanitation will help to overcome discrimination against women and girl children and persons living 
in informal settlements and rural areas. [Paragraph 8(b).] 
It noted that the grounds of discrimination listed within the ICESCR (Art 2(2)) are not based 
on a closed list (paras 15 and 27). Notably, in listing new grounds not mentioned in the 
Covenant — such as disability, nationality and sexual orientation — the General Comment 
also referred to the ground of economic and social situation (or class) (para 35). This is an 
important recognition of the links between poverty and substantive inequality specific to a 
range of groups.  
The CESCR also noted that discrimination may occur on multiple grounds (para 17). It stated 
that: 
Some individuals or groups of individuals face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited 
grounds, for example women belonging to an ethnic or religious minority. Such cumulative 
discrimination has a unique and specific impact on individuals and merits particular consideration and 
remedying. [Paragraph 17, emphasis added.] 
Although the term ‘cumulative discrimination’ is used, the definition is aligned with the 
meaning of intersectional discrimination. A little later in the General Comment, there is 
mention of the possibility of new forms of discrimination at ‘the intersection of two 
prohibited grounds of discrimination, e.g. where access to a social service is denied on the 
basis of sex and disability’ (para 27, emphasis added). Following this reference in the General 
Comment, the terms ‘intersection’ and ‘intersectionality’ started to appear more frequently in 
treaty body commentary.  
Although the examples used in CESCR General Comment No 20 to illustrate intersectionality 
are of women, the implication of the overall equality framework is that intersectional 
discrimination can be directed at a wide range of groups, including men facing various forms 
of discrimination.
3
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child also pointed to intersectional 
discrimination that was not based on gender. In General Comment No 11 (2009, on 
indigenous children and their rights under the Convention), the Committee required special 
measures that:  
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 Some of the treaty committee reporting guidelines are also gender neutral. See United Nations Secretary 
General 2009  for the combined guidelines which refer to ‘multiple discrimination’ (14, paras 51 and 55), while 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reporting guidelines( 60, para IIB) refer to ‘complex 





… consider the needs of indigenous children who may face multiple facets of discrimination and also 
take into account the different situation of indigenous children in rural and urban situations. Particular 
attention should be given to girls in order to ensure that they enjoy their rights on an equal basis as boys. 
States parties should furthermore ensure that special measures address the rights of indigenous children 
with disabilities. [Paragraph 29, emphasis added, footnote omitted.]  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child also produced General Comments on various 
forms of discrimination that intersect with discrimination experienced by children, including 
on the basis of disability (No 9) and HIV/AIDS (No 3) and noted the existence of ‘multiple 
forms of discrimination’ in relation to the health rights of children (No 15). The Committee’s 
expansion of the notion of intersectionality to new groups was an important progression of 
the concept within international law. 
Returning to a focus on women facing intersectional discrimination, The Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) produced General 
Recommendations on a range of specific groups of women, including older women (2010), 
women with disabilities (1991) and migrant women (2008). Its 2004, General 
Recommendation No 25 on temporary special measures was an effort by the Committee to 
bring a range of different terms and approaches within the UN human rights system into 
alignment (para 13) under the banner of a clearly articulated notion of substantive equality 
(paras 8–19) in pursuit of the goal of transformation (para 10). It defined substantive equality 
as requiring that: 
… women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve 
equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, 
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be 
taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be 
required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an 
effective strategy aimed at overcoming underrepresentation of women and a redistribution of resources 
and power between men and women. 
This approach to substantive equality called for a contextual and historical understanding of 
the multiple forms of systemic gender inequality (paras 10–11). The discussion of 
discrimination against women on the basis of more than one ground was located within this 
approach. The CEDAW Committee noted that: 
Certain groups of women, in addition to suffering from discrimination directed against them as women, 
may also suffer from multiple forms of discrimination based on additional grounds such as race, ethnic or 
religious identity, disability, age, class, caste or other factors. Such discrimination may affect these 
groups of women primarily, or to a different degree or in different ways than men. States parties may 
need to take specific temporary special measures to eliminate such multiple forms of discrimination 
against women and its compounded negative impact on them. [Paragraph 12, emphasis added.]  
This consideration of grounds of discrimination against women, although not phrased as 
intersectionality, was the first discussion by a treaty committee to link the concept of 
intersectionality to the idea of positive measures within a broader endorsement of the goal of 
substantive equality. 
This was restated in 2010 by the CEDAW Committee in General Recommendation No 28 on 
the Core Obligations of States Parties under Art 2 of CEDAW, this time with specific 
mention of the term ‘intersectionality’. The statement also required a general prohibition 
against intersectional discrimination and the need for policies and programs to ensure this, 
including temporary special measures. The General Recommendation included a broad 




Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general obligations of States parties 
contained in article 2. The discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with 
other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste 
and sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may affect 
women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must 
legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the 
women concerned and prohibits them. They also need to adopt and pursue policies and programmes 
designed to eliminate such occurrences, including, where appropriate, temporary special measures in 
accordance with article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention and general recommendation No. 25. 
[Paragraph 18, emphasis added.] 
The CEDAW Committee has provided a valuable definition of the term ‘intersectionality’ 
that is linked to remedial measures to achieve substantive equality. However, the more 
transformative understanding of substantive equality contained in the Committee’s 2004 
General Recommendation is not explicit in this definition.  
Other committees have highlighted discrimination against women on the basis of more than 
one ground. The Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its first General 
Comment on Equal Recognition before the Law (2014) noted that the CRPD ‘recognizes that 
women with disabilities may be subject to multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination 
based on gender and disability’. It gave the examples of women with disabilities ‘subjected to 
forced sterilization’, and ‘denied control of their reproductive health and decision-making’ on 
the assumption that ‘they are not capable of consenting to sex’ (para 35, emphasis added). 
The Committee for Migrant Workers has also noted the links between discrimination on the 
basis of migrant status and gender in relation to domestic workers (General Comment No 1, 
para 7). This is a crucial acknowledgment of the links between poverty, vulnerability and 
traditional grounds of discrimination that are generating new forms of discrimination in a 
changing global context. 
In its recent (2014) joint General Recommendation/Comment (No 31) on harmful practices, 
the CEDAW Committee, together with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, stated that: 
Harmful practices are persistent practices and behaviours that are grounded on discrimination on the 
basis of sex, gender, age and other grounds as well as multiple and/or intersecting forms of 
discrimination that often involve violence and cause physical and/or psychological harm or suffering. 
[Paragraph 14, emphasis added.] 
It also noted that:  
… sex- and gender-based discrimination intersect with other factors that affect women and girls, in 
particular those who belong to, or are perceived as belonging to disadvantaged groups, and who are 
therefore at a higher risk of becoming victims of harmful practices. Harmful practices are therefore 
grounded in discrimination based on sex, gender, age and other grounds and have often been justified by 
invoking socio-cultural and religious customs and values as well as misconceptions related to some 
disadvantaged groups of women and children. [Paras 5–6, emphasis added, footnote omitted.] 
Examples include ‘female genital mutilation, child and/or forced marriage, polygamy, crimes 
committed in the name of so-called honour and dowry-related violence’ (para 6). The 
Committees also stated that: 
Many other practices have been identified as harmful practices
 
which are all strongly connected to and 
reinforce socially constructed gender roles and systems of patriarchal power relations and sometimes 
reflect negative perceptions or discriminatory beliefs towards certain disadvantaged groups of women 




The joint General Recommendation/Comment contains a sophisticated discussion of the 
multidimensional structural underpinnings of harmful practices leading to violations of the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and girls and provides a rich 
suite of recommendations. 
In another recent General Recommendation (2014), No 32 on the gender-related dimensions 
of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, the CEDAW Committee 
drew from the earlier General Recommendation No 28 when it reaffirmed that: 
Discrimination against women based on sex and/or gender is often inextricably linked with and 
compounded by other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, age, 
class, caste, as well as being lesbian, bisexual or transgender (LBT) and other status. Discrimination on 
the basis of sex or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in 
different ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and 
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and prohibit them. [Paragraph 6, emphasis 
added, footnote omitted.] 
The General Recommendation is strongly intersectional in approach in requiring a gender-
based understanding of international refugee law and a contextual understanding of the 
specific factors that result in women seeking asylum (para 16). 
The CEDAW Committee through its General Recommendations has demonstrated an 
increasingly developed understanding of and approach to intersectionality.  
This discussion of the treaty body statements on intersectionality illustrates the evolution of 
the concept over the past 15 years. A range of terms has been used, such as ‘intertwined’, 
‘cumulative’, ‘compounded’ and ‘multiple’ discrimination, as well as more recent references 
to ‘intersecting’ discrimination and ‘intersectionality’. Some of these references (particularly 
those of the CEDAW Committee and the CESCR) are closely related to a broader articulation 
of substantive equality, while others have simply pointed to the need for states parties to be 
aware of the complex nature of discrimination. The CEDAW Committee definition of 
intersectionality in 2010, while important, would be improved by linking its concept of 
positive measures to address discrimination to the same Committee’s more transformative 
approach to substantive equality of 2004. The valuable linking of intersectional 
discrimination to economic inequality and poverty, highlighted by the CESCR in 2009, 
should also inform the way intersectionality is understood within international law. 
Before moving to a consideration of how the concept of intersectionality could be more 
clearly and consistently articulated within a full understanding of substantive equality that 
can address complex poverty, this article now provides some country-based examples that 
demonstrate the need for such a framework.  
Intersectional considerations: examples from social security and social protection 
International law can offer a rich framework for understanding discrimination intersectionally 
within efforts to address poverty linked to disadvantage. To illustrate the need for a fuller 
conception of intersectionality within international and domestic law, the following examples 
are drawn from the field of social security and social protection in India, Australia and South 
Africa. They concern social assistance measures to address poverty in South Africa and 
Australia and a public works program in India.  




The first example concerns the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 
2005 (known as NREGA). This is a highly celebrated public works program introduced in 
2006. The Act entitles every rural household whose adult members volunteer to undertake 
unskilled manual work at least 100 days per year at the statutory minimum wage. If an 
applicant is not provided with work within 15 days, he or she must be provided with an 
unemployment allowance. In the financial year of 2013–14, NREGA reached almost 50 
million households (Ministry of Rural Development, India 2014). It is hailed as the largest 
public works program in the world and is proving significant in mitigating the impacts of 
poverty in rural India. It has, however, had various implementation problems and there are 
some critiques of its design.  
Of significance for present purposes, the Act contains affirmative action measures. Thus, 
one-third of workdays are reserved for women (Sch II, s 6). The Act also builds in one-third 
representation of both women and members of ‘Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, the 
Other Backward Classes and Minorities’ as non-official members of the central (s 10(3)(d)) 
and state (12(1)) government bodies responsible for the scheme. Public works on land owned 
by Scheduled Castes and Tribes is given some priority (Sch I, s 1(iv)).
4
 
The promotion of vulnerable groups, particularly women, through NREGA is a significant 
feature of the scheme. It empowers rural women by giving them access to employment 
outside of the home and their own income, often for the first time. Similarly, for women who 
are not provided with work but who are paid through the unemployment allowance, this may 
be a rare opportunity to access income in their own right. In addition, women are paid at the 
same rate as men, unusual for many women in India (Khera and Nayak 2011, 81). Women 
are paid into their own bank or post office accounts (which is mandatory unless there is an 
official exemption of this requirement), also a beneficial new experience for many rural 
women. Since payment is at a higher rate than in the private sector, this may push up 
women’s wages in the agricultural sector as a whole and reduce the gender wage gap 
(Dasgupta and Sudarshan 2011, 14–15). 
The guidelines for the implementation of the Act (Ministry of Rural Development, India 
2013, 9.6) recognise the vulnerability and particular needs of ‘women in special 
circumstances’ (widowed women, deserted women and destitute women). This is critically 
important in the Indian context, where single women often face discrimination and stigma. 
The guidelines recommend that the administering body identify such women and ensure that 
they are provided with 100 days of work (9.6). They also make special provision for pregnant 
and lactating mothers (8 months before delivery and 10 months after), recommending work 
requiring less effort and that is closer to their homes (9.6.1). The needs of other vulnerable 
groups — including the elderly, people with disabilities, people who are internally displaced, 
nomadic tribes and particularly vulnerable tribal groups — are also addressed in the 
guidelines (9.2–9.9). There are detailed suggestions about ways of including these groups and 
specific forms of work that people with disabilities and older persons could be provided with. 
In this way, NREGA promises, at least on paper, to be deeply mindful of different forms of 
discrimination and intersectional discrimination.  
However, the extent to which such directives are being followed on the ground is difficult to 
assess if one looks at the statistical data provided by the government. The 2013–14 NREGA 
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 See the recommendations by Holmes, Sadana and Rath (2010) for community assets to reduce gender-specific 




figures show that women made up 52 per cent of person days on the program. The figures 
also indicate that Scheduled Castes made up 22 per cent of these person days and Scheduled 
Tribes made up 17 per cent and just 0.65 per cent for people with disabilities (Ministry of 
Rural Development, India 2014). The figures do not, however, provide a breakdown of 
gender within the groups of Scheduled Castes and Tribes. This means that men might be 
dominating access to work in these households and the figures will not illustrate this possibly 
skewing.  
Thus, although women are well represented within NREGA, it is also important to ensure that 
they are adequately represented within other prioritised groups so that the most vulnerable 
groups, containing people at the intersection of gender and caste discrimination, do not lose 
out. Improved data collection might point to the need for measures to ensure the participation 
of such groups. A substantive equality framework that incorporates intersectionality for treaty 
bodies would ensure that countries such as India are encouraged to build in more extensive 
disaggregated data collection so as to assess whether significant programs such as NREGA 
are achieving their equality goals and, if they are not, to take measures to address this. In this 
way, the complexities of poverty and discrimination would be examined and understood 
more clearly and addressed more fully through law and policy changes. 
Income management of welfare in Australia 
The second example stands in contrast to NREGA, as it concerns an attempt to control access 
to social security. Introduced in 2007 as an ‘intervention’
5
 to address violence against 
Indigenous women and children in Australia’s Northern Territory, the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) (NTER) contained a suite of racially discriminatory 
measures. In order to pass the legislation introducing the NTER into Indigenous 
communities, the government suspended the operation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth). The suspension was later lifted when the NTER was extended to all inhabitants of the 
Northern Territory. One feature of the package involves the compulsory management of 
people’s social security income by quarantining 50 per cent of it and placing this on what is 
called a ‘Basics Card’. The card can only be used at certain stores to purchase certain 
products. The stated aim of the measure was to prevent Indigenous welfare recipients from 
purchasing alcohol and cigarettes and gambling with the money. It was also designed 
ostensibly to prevent what is known as ‘humbugging’, where welfare recipients are bullied or 
‘guilt-tripped’ into handing over a portion of their welfare income.
6
  
The major outcry over the NTER and income management has concerned race 
discrimination. This has occurred both domestically and through complaints to and reports by 
international treaty bodies. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, James Anaya, questioned the characterisation of the NTER as a special measure, 
given its racially discriminatory features (Anaya 2010, paras 19–29). He noted that: 
This regime applies to all those living in prescribed areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, regardless of 
whether or not they have responsibilities over children or have been shown to have problems managing 
income in the past. By contrast, outside of the prescribed areas, income quarantining applies only on a 
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For a discussion of the problematic features of income management on Indigenous communities, see Cox 2011 




case-by-case basis in demonstrated situations of neglect, abuse, or inadequate school attendance. [3A 
para 13.] 
In addition, the Human Rights Committee (2009) and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (2010) called on the Australian government to ensure that the NTER 
was redesigned to comply with the requirements of appropriate and non-discriminatory 
special measures involving the participation of Indigenous people in this process. The focus 
of these groups was on race rather than gender discrimination because of the suspension of 
the Racial Discrimination Act and the targeting of Indigenous communities.  
What has not been noted by many commentators is that women (at 61 per cent) are the 
numerically dominant subjects of income management (Bray et al 2012, 57–58). While the 
measures were supposedly designed to help women and children, they have resulted in 
deepening the intersectional discrimination experienced by Indigenous women (Goldblatt 
2014).
 
One study of women’s experiences of income management found the Basics Card 
demeaning and stigmatising and that it limited consumer choices, creating more 
inconvenience and less opportunity for careful spending (Equality Rights Alliance 2011). 
Another study, by the Australian Law Reform Commission, found that compulsory income 
management could be dangerous and inappropriate in the context of family violence, since it 
removes control and further disempowers people who are exposed to such violence (2011, 
247–83). Watson has argued that income management resonates with the experiences of 
Indigenous women historically who were subject to the control of white protectors to whom 
they had to surrender their wages and welfare payments (2011).  
The focus on race discrimination in relation to criticism of compulsory income management 
within the NTER has been inadequately intersectional both in the examination of the impact 
of the measures and in the responses to the measures. A more integrated approach to 
intersectionality within international treaty body consideration of this issue would have 
pointed to the additional and particular inequalities experienced by Indigenous women. The 
example also illustrates the need to unpack supposedly beneficial special measures to 
consider whether they enhance the equality rights of the range of groups affected by the 
measures. An improved international law equality framework would offer a more systematic 
critique of Australia’s income management measures and would point to the need for more 
participatory, sophisticated and transformative responses to the complex poverty and 
inequality experienced by Indigenous Australians in all their diversity.
7
 
Equalising the pension in South Africa 
The final example concerns a challenge to a social security benefit that advantaged men over 
women. The government-provided pension, previously called the Old Age Pension and now 
known as the Older Persons Grant, is a means-tested social assistance benefit that is effective 
in addressing poverty in South Africa. From the 1930s, the pension was provided to women 
at the age of 60 and to men at the age of 65. In 2007, a group of men went to court to raise a 
constitutional challenge against the legislation authorising this age difference on the basis of 
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their rights to social security and equality (Roberts v Minister of Social Development, 2007). 
The government, in opposing this challenge, argued that the differential ages of eligibility 
were a positive measure to advantage women, who were a particularly disadvantaged group 
in society (Goldblatt and Rosa 2014, 262). The government’s arguments were premised on a 
contextual, historical and intersectional analysis of the position of black women under 
apartheid which, they argued, had created a legacy of disadvantage for this group of older 
women.  
This intersectional analysis, while accurate, pitted poor, elderly, black women against poor, 
elderly, black men in a contest over who was most disadvantaged. What is interesting about 
this approach was the assumption that substantive equality required choosing the worst off. 
However, a substantive equality approach, combined in this case with a commitment to social 
and economic rights (here, the right to social security) should not encourage a ‘race to the 
bottom’ for the most intersectionally vulnerable. Instead, it should ensure that distributive 
equality is achieved without losing sight of the needs of various disadvantaged groups. While 
the oppositional nature of litigation and a mechanical response to anti-discrimination and 
rights-based challenges can lead to narrow arguments such as this one, they should not 
prevent courts or other adjudicatory bodies from finding more nuanced and creative 
responses. For example, a court could have required equalisation of the pension while also 
encouraging further measures to address the particular circumstances of elderly women, such 
as better access to appropriate services.
8
 A clear framework at the international law level that 
encourages such a response could inform domestic responses to complex challenges that 
implicate poverty and intersectional disadvantage. 
Improved intersectional equality frameworks 
Before discussing how a consistent and fuller articulation of intersectionality might benefit 
the work of the treaty bodies and UN human rights agencies to address complex poverty and 
inequality, this section of the article will consider why such a framework is important for 
domestic efforts to achieve equality.  
Clear intersectional frameworks in international anti-discrimination law are important for the 
domestic implementation of human rights for a number of reasons. First, international law, 
through its reporting system, is used to monitor the practices of states parties to assess 
whether these are compliant with human rights. Anti-discrimination frameworks enable 
systemic evaluations of a country’s progress in addressing the circumstances of vulnerable 
and disadvantaged groups. Thus, for example, a fuller focus on intersectional disadvantage 
might have led the UN Committees to highlight the gender discrimination involved in 
Australia’s NTER.  
Second, the system of reporting requires states parties to account for their deficiencies and 
report on their progress in realising human rights. This requires states parties to collect data 
on many aspects that may not have been captured previously, including detailed demographic 
breakdowns and disaggregation based on new categories of social vulnerability. This data 
collection may become instructive within states parties and at the international level in 
pointing to problem areas that require redress and improvement. For example, requesting 
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India to provide a more detailed demographic breakdown of NREGA workers might point to 
areas for improvement in the scheme.  
Third, international anti-discrimination law both is influenced by domestic anti-
discrimination law and in turn influences its development at the national level. Thus, 
appropriate frameworks at the international level have the potential to inform and shape the 
understandings of states parties and courts with regard to intersectional equality. The 
government’s response to the court challenge to the pension in South Africa might have 
benefitted from consideration of a clear international law framework, while international law 
responses to intersectional inequality might gain from a consideration of this issue in 
domestic jurisprudence and legislation. It is important to acknowledge, however, that states 
parties sometimes ignore UN Committees and international human rights law as a whole. The 
progressive development of domestic and international law is clearly limited where this 
occurs. 
Finally, international anti-discrimination law is, like the law in many countries, divided into 
categories housed in separate treaties on women, race, disability and age (children). This 
approach, as with the emphasis on grounds within anti-discrimination law, can be valuable in 
providing focused attention on the specificities of discrimination in different social arenas. 
However, too much rigidity as a result of these separate locations can be harmful if this 
closes the space for intersectional complaints. A clear international equality law framework 
that integrates intersectionality can provide guidance for the development of improved 
domestic anti-discrimination laws and policies. 
At the treaty body and broader UN level, a clearer articulation of intersectionality within an 
understanding of substantive equality can encourage a focus on the complexities of 
discrimination and the need for far-reaching and sophisticated responses. Understanding how 
such discrimination contributes to poverty as a complex phenomenon can also focus attention 
on the important links between equality and social and economic rights (Liebenberg and 
Goldblatt 2007).
9
 There is growing awareness within the international human rights system of 
new grounds of discrimination that were not listed in the founding human rights documents. 
Thus, LGBTI people, older persons and indigenous peoples are just some of the groups 
gaining increasing recognition. The idea that grounds of discrimination can expand and 
change introduces the space for a more flexible approach to grounds. It opens the space for a 
fuller awareness of intersectionality. This more expansive approach to grounds requires 
increased attention to context and evidence of the complexities of human experience. It also 
focuses attention on the need to unravel the layers of vulnerability and disadvantage in 
inquiring into discrimination. This contextual approach values the importance of grounds as 
markers of inequality, but is not fixated on their mechanical application. It combines attention 
to grounds within a contextual enquiry that is central to a substantive equality approach. As 
noted by the CEDAW Committee (in General Recommendation No 25, 2004) substantive 
equality requires social transformation based on an understanding of the historical and 
systemic forces that shape inequality. Within this contextual inquiry, the injunction to look at 
the intersections of discrimination leads to a fuller appreciation of group-based disadvantage 
and harm and helps to shape more nuanced and effective responses. This enquiry should also 
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pay attention to the multidimensional nature of inequality, which concerns status-based 
subordination, distributive disadvantage, failure to accommodate difference and lack of 
participation (Fredman 2008a). While a focus on intersectional discrimination separate from a 
substantive equality framework can lead to either overwhelming attention to ever-more 
detailed forms of disadvantage or unhelpful hierarchies of vulnerability, an integrated 
understanding of intersectionality embedded within a substantive equality approach can 
generate creative, practical and structural responses that lead to transformative outcomes.  
As discussed in the review of treaty body General Comments and recommendations, there is 
not a consistent approach to the issue of intersectionality across the work of the committees. 
Some committees have provided quite limited guidance on the issue of equality and 
intersectionality. A single General Comment on equality that relates to all committees or 
specific General Comments for those committees that have not addressed this issue 
adequately would be valuable. The Harmonized Guidelines for states parties’ reports set out 
what is required regarding non-discrimination and equality (United Nations Secretary 
General 2009, paras 50–59), but this document does not use the term ‘substantive equality’ or 
give content to this concept. It also does not use the term ‘intersectionality’, instead using the 
term ‘multiple discrimination’ — which suggests an additive approach rather than one that 
acknowledges new forms of discrimination that arise at the intersection of two or more 
grounds. The requirement that states parties provide demographic and other statistical data is 
not linked to the need for analysis of inequality within each state.
10
 It is suggested that these 
guidelines be improved so as to build in a more substantive understanding of equality and a 
fuller consideration of intersectionality to inform state reporting.
11
 This approach could also 
be followed by states within the Universal Periodic Review process. 
Conclusion 
This article has considered how intersectionality is understood within international anti-
discrimination law. It has found a growing awareness of this issue, but an inconsistent 
elaboration of the concept within the treaty system. Second, it has looked at social protection 
measures in three countries to illustrate the need for clearer frameworks that locate 
intersectionality within a substantive approach to equality. Lastly, it has pointed to the value 
of improved international law frameworks, what these should contain and how they might be 
more consistently applied across the treaty system. This might contribute to addressing 
poverty, which is complex in nature and intimately linked to discrimination and disadvantage. 
While law’s regulatory function and its categorising role serve to reinforce the status quo 
(Grabham 2009, 192), law can also be subverted and reimagined to pose questions about the 
nature and causes of poverty and inequality and to propose new ways of tackling these. Anti-
discrimination law that brings to light systemic (intersectional) inequality and responds 
robustly and creatively to this challenge has the potential to be transformative.  
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